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Abstract 
This paper aims to analyze the leadership models of the European 
Commission in terms of the function of setting the agenda of the European 
Union and in terms of political leadership. In this context, at the European 
level leadership is shared between several actors, making it difficult for the 
European Commission to exercise leadership traditionally, mostly for its lack 
of direct decision-making powers. Thus, the most relevant political roles of 
the President of the European Commission are to set the European agenda and 
to persuade and influence the other stake-holders to follow his directions for 
deepening European integration. In this regard, the article comparatively 
analyzes the leadership of Jacques Delors, Jean-Claude Juncker, and Ursula 
von der Leyen to identify the leadership model proposed at the beginning of 
their term, and to what extent, they exercised a political role. The tools used 
in the analysis are the inaugural speeches and the following three variables: 
how they organized the Commission to strengthen the political role of the 
President, how they mobilized resources from the other institutions of the 
European Union, and the formation of coalitions and networks. The article 
concluded that the leadership model proposed by Ursula von der Leyen falls 
within the supranational pattern of Delors' time, moving away from the model 
of political leadership proposed by Juncker. The accuracy of the research is 
limited by the fact that Ursula von der Leyen is only in her first year as 
President of the European Commission. 
Keywords: European Commission, agenda-setting, political leadership, 
Ursula von der Leyen, Spitzenkandidaten, entrepreneurial leadership 
 
Introduction 
The leadership of the European Commission is difficult to identify, 
given the fragmented and polycentric structure of the European Union, where 
several actors share the leadership exercise, and unlike the governments of the 
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Member States, which carry out their leadership activity in a relatively stable 
environment, the Commission Presidency exercises its leadership in an 
unpredictable context. Thus, the political leadership of the Commission, in the 
traditional sense, is less visible at European level, due to the lack of direct 
decision-making powers, the main way of exercising a political role and 
extensive use of powers is through agenda-setting. In other words, in their 
mission of deepening European integration (Nugent, 1995, p. 609), the 
President of the Commission does not hold the monopoly of leadership in the 
European Union, though they exercise leadership, a capacity that can be 
measured according to the institutional, situational and personal resources 
(Endo, 1999, pp.19-26) and the context in which it operates (Nugent, 1995, p. 
605). Given that, like the European Commission, other actors play an 
important role in the negotiations on the future of the European Union, its role 
in shaping and influencing the agenda is not exclusive. However, throughout 
the history of European integration, the European Commission has played a 
central role in taking the initiative and introducing major changes at Union 
level. In this respect, the Commission's initiatives towards the Single European 
Market, the Single European Act, and the European Monetary Union should 
be recalled during Delors's presidency (Nugent, 1995, pp. 619-620). 
Therefore, the most relevant role of the political leadership of the 
Presidents of the Commission, given their right of initiative in decision-
making, is that of shaping and influencing the agenda through agenda-setting 
(Müller, 2017, p. 130). Firstly, the European Commission has the role of 
convincing and influencing the other actors of the European Union to follow 
its position, regarding the future of the Union, thus acting as a directional 
political leadership. Secondly, it plays an important role in the legislative 
initiative, acting as policy entrepreneurship and shaping the decision-making 
process, acting within the meaning of its adjudication (Nugent & Rhinard, 
2017, pp. 10-12). Thirdly, the Commission can act as a leader through treaty 
reform (Kassim & Dimitrakopoulos, 2006, pp. 102-103). The Commission is 
noted in the activities of policy initiation, process facilitation, policy 
management and implementation (Nugent & Rhinard, 2019, pp. 207-214), and 
like the Council is acting as agenda manager and broker in the negotiations 
(but see Tallberg, 2006, pp. 29-31, 2010, p. 243; Borrás, 2007, pp. 5-6; Gatti 
& Manzini, 2012, p. 1714). 
Furthermore, the leadership of the European Commission can be 
analyzed according to the resources it has and how it exploits them, the context 
of the negotiations in which it takes place, and the chosen strategy (Mazzucelli 
& Beach, 2006, pp. 10-18). The European Commission can adopt a style of 
structural leadership (through the use of material resources to forge an area of 
possible agreement) or instrumental (through the managing agenda, the 
creation of compromises and coalitions, but also through brokerage) 
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(Mazzucelli & Beach, 2006, pp. 17-18). In addition, the Commission may also 
adopt a style of institutional, agenda-setting, mediation and public leadership 
(Endo, 1999, p. 28, 36; Müller, 2019, p. 3; Müller, 2016, p. 69; Tömmel, 2019, 
pp. 5-8). In the studies conducted on the leadership of the European 
Commission, a series of classifications of its leaders can be found, according 
to the activity undertaken: active presidential, steered presidential, primus 
inter pares, passive chair (Kassim, 2013, pp. 9-11), symbolic, adaptative 
(Maythorne & Peterson, 2010, pp. 14-15), structural, instrumental (Mazzucelli 
& Beach, 2006, pp. 10-18; Hodson, 2013), agenda-setters, popularisers, 
inventors, brokers (Young, 1991, pp. 284-286). 
Current research offers a wide range of studies conducted from the 
perspective of the resource structure and constraints of the European 
Commission, considering that Jacques Delors managed them to the highest 
degree, using them extensively and acting to minimize constraints (Endo, 
1999; Blondel, 1987; Nugent, 1995; Tömmel, 2013, 2018, 2019; Müller, 2020, 
2016; Bürgin, 2017; Kassim, 2013, 2019a; Ross & Jenson, 2017). In his work, 
the President of the European Commission exercises his leadership both in the 
supranational framework of the Commission and in the intergovernmental 
environment of the European Council, which is one of its most important 
resources, in order to shape and influence the agenda (Endo, 1999, pp. 54-55). 
The leadership performance of the European Commission can be measured by 
three dynamics: static (the function holder acts only within the resource and 
constraint structure); mobilization (acts by exploiting resources and 
constraints, reducing constraints); structural change (acts to expand and create 
new resources and opportunities, minimizing constraints) (Endo, 1999, p. 27). 
The Commission's leadership has a crucial role in the negotiation process 
regarding the new reform initiatives of the European Union, which are 
introduced on the European agenda, and in this respect, there are several stages 
in the negotiation process of the European Commission, as they were 
identified in leadership literature: firstly, the diagnosis phase, secondly, the 
formula phase and thirdly, the agreement phase (Mazzucelli & Beach, 2006, 
p. 18), which can be associated with three functions of the Commission, 
namely agenda-setting leadership (for the first phase), mediative leadership 
(for the second phase) and brokerage leadership (for the third phase). This 
analogy can be explained by the fact that in the diagnosis phase the premises 
of a solution creation appear, in the formula phase solutions are created and 
inter-institutional coalitions are formed, and in the agreement phase brokerage 
is made for joint gains (Mazzucelli & Beach, 2006, p. 18). 
Regarding the agenda-setting function, it is ideal that it be carried out 
under monopoly conditions over the initiative and independence from ad hoc 
pressure. Additionally, in the context of agenda-setting, formal governance 
can be referred to when the Commission “selectively bars some governmental 
European Scientific Journal July 2020 edition Vol.16, No.20 ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
4 
initiatives from the legislative agenda” or informal governance when the 
Commission “customarily endorses governmental proposals” (Kleine, 2013, 
pp. 43-48). It is considered that the level of ambition, the style, the resources 
mobilized are determining factors in the impact of the Commission leader on 
the shaping and setting of the agenda (Kassim, 2013, p. 9; Endo, 1999, p. 26). 
It is well-known that the agenda-setting leadership has become visible since 
the beginning of the European Commission, with the Customs Union 
acceleration program (initiated by Hallstein), the re-launch of the Monetary 
Union initiative through the European Monetary System (by Jenkins), the 
shaping of the ESPRIT initiative (by Thorn), initiatives on the Single 
European Market, negotiations on the Single European Act, the launch of the 
European Monetary Union plan and the White Paper on the Internal Market 
(owned by Delors) (Endo, 1999, pp. 38-39; Hodson, 2016). 
That being said, the agenda-setting is relevant in the new context of 
the Presidency of Ursula von der Leyen, who has ambitiously outlined her 
agenda, wishing to advance in directions that the previous Commission was 
not successful, establishing as the main directions of action the deepening The 
Monetary Economic Union, the reform Dublin regulations on migration and 
asylum (“New Pact on Migration and Asylum”), the full implementation of 
the European Pillar of Social Rights. However, the most important ambition 
of the new President of the Commission is “The European Green Deal”, a 
program that aims to transform Europe into the first continent with a neutral 
climate, by 2050, at the same time, stimulating the competitiveness, 
innovation, competition of European industry, and also a plan to reduce 
European Union emissions by 2030 (Von der Leyen, 2019a). Thus, by 
achieving the objectives of this plan, a circular economy would be created, 
which promotes the sustainable use of resources. It is quite clear that Ursula 
von der Leyen has acted to set the European Union's agenda, by pursuing 
ambitious goals and therefore, in the context of setting the European agenda 
from the zero point, an association can be seen between Leyen's ambitious 
directions with those of Delors in 1985 when he exercised agenda-setting 
leadership by launching the Single European Market program. On the other 
hand, Juncker attempted to create a political commission, as a form of 
strengthening the position of President of the Commission, as he had stated 
before the European Parliament in July 2014, being the first President elected 
through the Spitzenkandidaten process (Kassim & Laffan, 2019b, p. 51). In 
this context, several studies have conducted the analysis over Juncker's 
political leadership, following the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten 
model, focusing on how he managed to mobilize resources for influencing and 
shaping the agenda (but see Kassim & Laffan, 2019; Kassim et.al., 2019a; 
Tömmel, 2018, 2019; Müller, 2013, 2020; Bürgin, 2017; Peterson, 2016; 
Darmé, 2019; Hanck, 2018). Therefore, it is interesting to note the extent to 
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which Leyen is closer to Juncker’s model of the political commission or 
Delors’s supranational model. 
Research question and methodology 
The research problem of this article focuses on identifying the 
leadership model proposed by Jacques Delors, Jean-Claude Juncker, and 
Ursula von der Leyen at the beginning of the term and to what extent they 
exercised a political role. This article seeks to answer the following research 
question: To what extent has Ursula von der Leyen's leadership moved away 
from Juncker's model of political leadership and reverted to the supranational 
pattern of Delors' time? 
Therefore, this article analyzes the leadership models of the European 
Commission through its agenda-setting role, following the capacities and 
abilities in shaping and influencing the Community decision-making process. 
In this regard, the article makes a comparative analysis of the leadership of 
Delors, Juncker and von der Leyen, which attempts to identify the leadership 
model proposed by each at the beginning of their term. As such, the relevant 
analysis tools for establishing the leadership style adopted in agenda-setting 
are the candidacy and inaugural speeches, and the method applied to the 
selected instruments (the speeches) is the comparison of the discourse 
analysis. Hence, the analysis of the inaugural speeches will use the relevant 
theoretical framework to identify the appropriate types of leadership for 
setting the agenda, following Young’s (1989, 1991) typology: structural, 
entrepreneurial and intellectual. The discourse analysis will take into 
consideration the descriptors and concepts derived from Young’s taxonomy 
of leadership styles, in order to see which of these descriptors are predominant 
for the three leaders. 
On the other hand, regarding to the capacity of shaping and influencing 
the decision-making process (in other words, the political leadership of the 
European Commission), the analysis will use the following variables, 
considered to be determining factors for the success of the Commission: 
firstly, the Commission design will be analyzed, in order to establish whether 
it is organised in that manner for a political Commission or for the purpose of 
strengthening the political power of the President (the political nature of the 
organizational charts of the three Colleges of Commissioners will be analyzed 
here); secondly, the article will take into consideration how Delors, Juncker 
and Leyen mobilized resources from the main institutions of the European 
Union (their relationship with the European Parliament, the European Council 
and the Council); thirdly, the analysis will take into account the networks and 
coalitions created by Delors, Juncker and Leyen at the European Union level, 
which can determine the efficiency of the agenda-setting, whether it is about 
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the relations with the Secretary-General, the chief of the presidential cabinet 
or the Franco-German tandem. 
 
Leadership style in setting the agenda 
Regarding the political leadership of the European Commission, there 
are two relevant approaches in this respect. On the one hand, the political 
leadership understood from agenda-setting point of view, by influencing and 
shaping the agenda, where the manner and extent to which the resources of the 
Commission were mobilized by the President is relevant (Müller, 2017: 130). 
On the other hand, the political leadership of the Commission can be 
understood, after 2014, from the perspective of the Spitzenkandidaten process, 
as can be found in Article 17 (7) of the Treaty on European Union: “Taking 
into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held 
the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified 
majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President 
of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European 
Parliament by a majority of its component members. If he does not obtain the 
required majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall 
within one month propose a new candidate who shall be elected by the 
European Parliament following the same procedure”, when Juncker was the 
first president elected following this process. In this context, the 
Spitzenkandidaten process represents an attempt to address the democratic 
deficit of the European Union, through parliamentarization (Kassim & Laffan, 
2019b, p. 50). Even President Juncker stated before the European Parliament 
on the 15th of July 2014 that: “The Commission is political. And I want it to 
be more political. Indeed, it will be highly political” (Juncker, 2014b, p. 1). 
Nevertheless, the first part of the research will follow Müller’s approach to 
political leadership, namely from the perspective of the President's role in 
setting the agenda of the European Union. 
On that account, in identifying the leadership style adopted by Delors, 
Juncker and von der Leyen when setting the European Union agenda, the paper 
will analyze their candidacy and inaugural speeches. In this sense, the 
discourse analysis will consider the descriptors and concepts from Young’s 
taxonomy of leadership styles, namely structural, entrepreneurial, and 
intellectual (1991, pp. 287-288). Firstly, structural leadership is characterized 
by transforming material resources (structural powers) into negotiating 
leverage to reach an agreement (Young, 1991, p. 288; Mazzucelli & Beach, 
2006, pp. 17-18). The structural leadership uses two types of tactics to reach 
the desired agreement, for instance: a threat to stall the negotiation process, if 
concessions are not made in favour of its provisions and rewards to the parties 
that have followed its direction (Young, 1991, p. 289). Here, it is important to 
note that structural leadership is difficult to identify at the Commission level, 
European Scientific Journal July 2020 edition Vol.16, No.20 ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
7 
due to its lack of structural power, but there are several situations where the 
President of the Commission used its prestige and the power of initiative in 
order to create leverage to attract more support from other institutions. 
Secondly, entrepreneurial leadership is defined as the negotiation skills used 
to influence the way issues are presented in the negotiations, modeling 
mutually acceptable agreements for all parties (Young, 1991, p. 288). It is 
worth mentioning that the entrepreneurial leaders fulfill several functions, as 
follows: agenda-setters (shaping the way issues are presented internationally), 
popularisers (draw attention to the important issues in the discussion), 
inventors (propose policies to overcome obstacles), brokers (striking deals) 
(Young, 1991, p. 294). Thirdly, intellectual leadership refers to the activity 
whereby a system of ideas is produced to model how negotiation participants 
understand the issues in question and the options available (Young 1991, pp. 
298-301). Therefore, the analysis will take into account these concepts 
mentioned above. The following table illustrates more clearly the concepts 
considered in discourse analysis. 
Table 1. Leadership style in institutional bargaining 
LEADERSHIP 
STYLE 
STRUCTURAL ENTREPRENEURIAL INTELLECTUAL 
DESCRIPTORS  - “the ability to 
translate structural 
power into 
bargaining leverage 
as a means of 
reaching agreement 
on the terms of 
constitutional 
contracts in social 
settings of the sort 
exemplified by 
international 
society”. 
 
- “influence the manner 
in which issues are 
presented and to fashion 
mutually acceptable 
deals bringing willing 
parties together on the 
terms of constitutional 
contracts yielding 
benefits for all”. 
- “an agenda-setter and 
populariser who uses 
negotiating skill to 
devise attractive 
formulas and to broker 
interests”. 
- “intellectual capital 
or generative systems 
of thought that shape 
the perspectives of 
those who participate 
in institutional 
bargaining”.  
- “a thinker who 
seeks to articulate the 
systems of thought” 
- “new visions and 
the concerns they 
engender are likely to 
loom larger and 
larger in institutional 
bargaining processes 
at the international 
level”. 
agenda-setters  
popularisers  
inventors  
brokers  
(Young 1991, pp. 287-300) 
 
Jacques Delors 
The literature offers many models of analysis on Jacques Delors' 
leadership. First of all, Delors is a good example of transformative leadership 
(Ross & Jenson, 2017, p. 115, 124; Tömmel, 2013, p. 798), both in the 
management of the supranational commission and in its work within the 
intergovernmental European Council, for his power of conviction and 
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persuasion on the importance of his initiatives. Delors' leadership is 
recognized as predominantly entrepreneurial, due to his success in creating the 
European Single Market, which has brought numerous possibilities for joint 
gains at the intergovernmental level (Ross & Jenson, 2017, p. 118). Along the 
same line, Delors is a practitioner of mediative and agenda-setting leadership, 
noting in this regard, by the way he created and strengthened alliances 
(especially through the networks formed at the Commission level, led by the 
chief to his cabinet, Pascal Lamy, but also through his favorable connection 
with the Franco-German tandem represented by Mitterrand and Kohl), through 
striking deals that support his desired position, but also through initiatives such 
as Single European Act, European Monetary Union, White Paper (Endo, 1999, 
pp. 38-39). In other words, Delors has successfully exercised its leadership in 
setting the agenda, as this success in setting the agenda is not just about 
introducing innovative ideas or bringing new issues to the agenda, but about 
establishing coherent themes and strategies in the integrationist spirit (Müller, 
2017, p. 140).  
At the time of setting the European agenda, Delors acted as an 
entrepreneurial and intellectual leader. Delors was an entrepreneurial and 
intellectual leader since he shaped and influenced the agenda to reap joint 
gains for all the participants in the bargaining and he presented a new and 
innovative vision that was needed after a long stagnation phase in the 
European negotiations. Thus, in order to demonstrate this assertion, the article 
will analyze his speech from 14-15 January 1985 and establish which of 
Young's taxonomy concepts are more prominent.  
To begin with, the article will analyze the elements of entrepreneurial 
leadership identified in Delors' speech, paying more attention to the four 
functions of the entrepreneurial leader, namely: agenda-setter, popularisers, 
inventors, brokers. First of all, Delors (1985, p. 5) changes the paradigm in 
which the problems faced by the European Community are presented and 
addressed by focusing on “how to go about it”, and not on “what has to be 
done”, as noted in his speech: I believe that the engineers of European 
integration are fumbling not over 'what has to be done' but rather over 'how 
to go about it'; What approach do I have in mind since my theme is, and will 
continue to be, 'how to go about it?'. Here, he acts as an agenda-setter, shaping 
the way issues are presented. Also, by the following sentence: it may not be 
over-optimistic to announce a decision to eliminate all frontiers within Europe 
by 1992 and to implement it, Delors (1985, p. 6) anticipates the creation of the 
Single European Market, which is the main purpose of the entrepreneurial 
leader, namely to influence how problems are presented in order to reap joint 
gains. More precisely, the S.E.M. allowed the creation of a win-win situation 
for all Member States, much needed in the context of collective action 
problems that the European Community was facing at the time. On the other 
European Scientific Journal July 2020 edition Vol.16, No.20 ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
9 
hand, Delors (1985, p. 7) again acts as an agenda-setter and populariser for the 
main community issues, arguing that removing borders will not be enough to 
solve the problems regarding the high level of unemployment of Europeans. 
Further, Delors (1985, p. 9) assumes one more time the role of broker and 
populariser in his speech, drawing attention to the need to reach an agreement 
in collective bargaining, as follows: when will we see the first European 
collective bargaining agreement? […] A European collective agreement is not 
just an empty slogan. It would provide a dynamic framework, one that 
respected differing views-a spur to initiative, not a source of paralysing 
uniformity. However, his role as a broker is even better highlighted in his 
actions of managing difficulties at the institutional level, as can be seen in: 
Should a difficulty arise between two institutions, the Commission will 
endeavour to decide whether the root cause is a fundamental difference of 
opinion between the Member States, or whether it is, quite simply, a 
confrontation between the powers of the institutions. […] In the first case, 
where a fundamental difference of opinion is involved, it will be for the 
Council to initiate frank discussions and for Parliament to debate the issue 
and involve public opinion. In the second case, where a confrontation of 
powers or susceptibilities is involved, the Commission will attempt to act as 
honest broker to ensure that non-essentials-institutional friction do not cloud 
essentials the progress of European integration (Delors, 1985, p. 15). 
As an agenda-setter, Delors (1985, pp. 9-10) establishes the three main 
directions of the Commission for the next four years, namely: a large market 
and industrial cooperation; the strengthening of the European Monetary 
System; and the convergence of economies to lead to higher growth and more 
jobs, drawing attention to the essential need for unity and integration, because 
what the European Community lacked was: […] the benefit of scale and the 
multiplier effect; […] a united team; […] a single economic and social area. 
In this regard, Delors (1985, p. 18) emphasizes the importance of reaching 
agreements in negotiations, proposing a transition from the old type of 
diplomacy with a tit-for-tat approach to a unitary approach on diagnosis and 
strategic proposals, which can bring joint gains for all parties. Delors argues 
that the only time the European Community managed to convince the United 
States of America was when they had a unitary vision and position, thus being 
the reason why institutional quarrels that lead to stagnation must be avoided. 
Here, Delors' role as an agenda-setter can be seen, as well as a broker, 
in trying to overcome the impediments in the negotiations, caused by the lack 
of unitary action, the institutional problems, the wide range of different 
opinions, the opposing positions, the divergent proposals and strategies, thus 
promoting unity at the level of the European Community. Additionally, Delors 
(1985, pp. 19-20) is a populariser, drawing attention to the lack of unity in the 
commercial market, as he argues: There is no point in wanting a strong ECU 
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in a splintered market. Feudalism is just as out of place in monetary affairs as 
it is in economics and trade. Entrepreneurial leadership, according to Young, 
is an action by which an agreement is reached in order to reap acceptable gains 
for all parties (Young, 1991, p. 288), thus a win-win situation. This definition 
describes precisely what Delors (1985, p. 21) proposes to the European 
Parliament in the following excerpts: Why don't you, with the approval of your 
enlarged Bureau, let's say twice a year, choose a subject which you, rather 
than the Commission, would begin to study. Why don't you conduct the 
necessary hearings […] and prepare a resolution as a basis for us to work on. 
I think that if we could get an arrangement of this kind going, there would be 
better understanding, more scope for cooperation between our two 
institutions. We wouldn't be climbing alone […].  
On the other hand, in terms of intellectual leadership, the analysis looks at 
those parts of the discourse that reveal Delors' ability to use the power of ideas 
in shaping intellectual capital. In this regard, the most important attempt to 
shape thinking is the call for a future European Union (Let us do what we can 
to ensure that by June, the deadline set by the European Council for a debate 
of the utmost importance, progress made towards strengthening our 
Community will justify our determination to press onwards to European 
Union) (Delors, 1985, p. 16). Moreover, Delors has proposed a new 
perspective on approach and understanding of the issues, acting to orient the 
parties on the available options. First, he has introduced a set of ideas about 
the main challenges, namely approach, in which he stands for unity; influence, 
through an active role of the Commission and civilization, by capitalizing on 
differences and diversity in a new construction (Delors, 1985, p. 16). 
Secondly, in his attempt to convince and influence the parties on the 
advantages of creating a Single European Market, Delors (1985, p. 11) argues 
that the burden of the national aid could be replaced, through cooperation at a 
larger scale between European firms, with financial incentives. 
Thirdly, Delors (1985, p. 21) is trying to shape the thinking to act based 
on the current Treaty, rather than making a new one, highlighting the possible 
problems that could arise if hypothetically the 10 member states would agree 
to a new treaty, namely: When would this new treaty come into force? Three 
years later at the earliest. So what do we do for those three years? Do we meet 
to polish up the draft? To improve it? Or do we do nothing at all? […] There 
is no need to abandon 'the great beyond' but we must go on working here and 
now within the existing Treaty, all of the Treaty. 
That being said, Delors acted in the manner of an entrepreneurial leader 
for many reasons, as follows: first, in his speech, he influenced how the 
community problems are presented and established the future directions of 
action on the European agenda, being a populariser of the unitary and cohesive 
action; secondly, through brokerage he tried to manage the difficulties at the 
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institutional level, emphasized the importance of reaching an agreement in 
negotiations and acted to overcome the impediments of the intra-institutional 
and inter-institutional negotiations caused by the problems of collective 
action; thirdly, Delors has acted to create win-win situations at the 
intergovernmental level, thus trying to obtain mutually acceptable agreements 
and common gains for all parties. On the other hand, Delors is also an 
intellectual leader, as he used the power of ideas to shape intellectual capital, 
identifying new ways of transposing problems, different from the old ideas, 
settled in the participants' minds. In other words, the most important ideas 
Delors used during his speech is the one that invokes the creation of the Single 
European Market and the European Union. And with these ideas, he is also an 
inventor, in the sense given by Young, because these initiatives came after a 
long period of stagnation in European affairs. 
 
Jean Claude Juncker  
Juncker's leadership is highly debated in the literature, especially for 
the particular character of the Spitzenkandidaten process. In this regard, the 
analysis conducted on Juncker's leadership takes into account the three 
dimensions identified by Endo (1999, p. 26), namely the institutional, 
situational and personal ones (but see Tömmel, 2018, 2019; Müller, 2019; 
Bürgin, 2017). Thus, in terms of his personal qualities, the following are 
relevant: his ability to bring new visions, policies and strategies for deepening 
European integration; its ability to convince other decision-makers to follow 
its directions and visions, through compromised brokering and negotiation 
skills (Tömmel, 2018, p. 139). In addition, Juncker's leadership model is 
important as it strengthened the Commission Presidency and continued in the 
direction of the Barosso Commission to strengthen cooperation relations with 
the European Parliament, thus operationalizing a political Commission 
through a series of structural and procedural reforms (Kassim & Laffan, 
2019b, pp. 53-54; Kassim et.al., 2019a, pp. 13-15). 
When setting the agenda, Juncker acted in the manner of an 
entrepreneurial and structural leader. In this regard he acted in order to 
influence the way issues were presented before de members of the Parliament 
and he used the bargaining leverage for gaining more support for his desired 
directions. This statement will be demonstrated by analyzing his speech on 15 
July 2014 before the European Parliament.  
The first example for Juncker's (2014b, p. 2) entrepreneurial leadership 
can be seen in the change of approach regarding the issues at stake, from an 
intergovernmental approach to a team approach, which he calls the 
“Community method” (In Europe we should play as a team. Let us apply the 
Community method. Yes, it is demanding, but it is effective, it is tried and 
tested and it is more credible than intergovernmental wrangling. We need to 
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restore the Community method). Juncker (2014a, p. 4) acts as an agenda-setter 
from the outset, arguing that the Commission will focus only on 10 policy 
areas, leaving Member States to address other issues, as he stated in the 
Political Guidelines for the next Commission: I want a European Union that 
is bigger and more ambitious on big things, and smaller and more modest on 
small things. In this regard, Juncker (2014b, p. 4) shapes how the problems of 
the agenda are presented, arguing that the European Union should not be 
solving all the problems of Europe, but only the major problems, as seen in 
the following excerpt: […] the European Commission - and the European 
Union - concerns itself with the really major European issues instead of 
interfering from all angles in every detail of people's lives. Not every problem 
that exists in Europe is a problem for the European Union. We must take care 
of the big issues. 
From his speech, it is clear that Juncker (2014b, p. 2) will act in a 
reform direction, trying to get out of the resource and constraints structure that 
Endo was referring to, setting ambitious goals to make Europe more 
competitive (Europe needs a broad-based agenda for reform. […] The status 
quo does not provide us with a full range of tools. It has to be extended). In 
addition, Juncker (2014b, pp. 3-5) becomes a populariser, but at the same time 
a broker by drawing the attention to the importance of the issues at stake and 
strikes deals for their solution, such as: competition (Competitiveness is 
essential to make the European Union a more attractive location. A location 
for people, for investors), renewable energies (Renewable energies and their 
development is a sine qua non if tomorrow's Europe really is going to create 
lasting, consistent and sustainable locational advantages), the refugee crisis 
(Illegal immigration and the refugee crisis are not the problems of Malta, 
Cyprus, Italy or Greece, they are the problems of Europe as a whole), 
unemployment (What we need is an ambitious package for employment, 
growth, investment and competitiveness. […] If Europe invests more, Europe 
will be more prosperous and create more jobs), the completion of the internal 
market (The internal market has to be completed. If we are successful in this, 
we will add another €200 billion of added value to the European economy), 
the energy policy (We have to reorganise Europe’s energy policy into a new 
European Energy Union. […] We need to diversify our energy sources and 
reduce the high energy dependency of several of our member states), single 
digital market (Roaming charges in Europe have to disappear and they will 
disappear. If we are successful in implementing a real digital single market, 
we can generate €250 billion of additional growth in Europe). It is worth 
mentioning that Juncker (2014b, p. 3) is trying to shape the agenda in the 
direction of a social-economic market, emphasizing the importance of people 
and of the fact that the economy must serve the people and thus, the social 
dialogue should receive more attention. (The social market economy can only 
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work if there is social dialogue. […] I would like to be a President of social 
dialogue). 
Moreover, Juncker (2014b, p. 5) set the agenda for Europe to become 
number one in renewable energy, just as Ursula von der Leyen has established 
that Europe will be the first climate-neutral continent (I want the European 
Union to become the world number one in renewables. We will contribute 
significantly to enhancing energy efficiency beyond the 2020 objective […] A 
binding 30 % objective for energy efficiency by 2030 is to me the minimum). 
On the other hand, Juncker also exercises the role of inventor, because he acts 
in order to eliminate obstacles that slow down the agreement and the unitary 
achievement of the objectives of the community institutions. In this regard, 
the following excerpt from his speech is relevant because, here, Juncker 
(2014b, p. 6) draws attention to the importance of unity, both in terms of 
Economic and Monetary Union, and the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy: I want the Economic and Monetary Union, and the euro, to be 
represented by a single chair and a single voice in the Bretton Woods 
institutions. […] It would be fine by me if the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were no longer thwarted by the 
Foreign Ministers of the Member States and I will ensure this does not happen. 
A common foreign policy also needs a common external image. 
Regarding intellectual leadership, although it cannot be said that 
Juncker has generated a system or capital of innovative ideas, practically 
continuing in the direction of the efforts made by the other Commissions, still 
his agenda has ambitious goals. Given the fact that Juncker began his term as 
President of the Commission in a context marked by a multitude of crises, such 
as the refugee crisis, the eurozone crisis and the possibility of a Grexit, the 
Ukrainian energy crisis and others, it was expected that the agenda would rise 
to the level of the international situation. Even though Juncker did not provide 
innovative intellectual capital, he supported the use of ideas that already exist 
(We cannot spend money we do not have. We have to replace deficits and debts 
by ideas. The ideas are there: we must make better use of the opportunities 
[…]), precisely like an entrepreneurial leader, as Young (1991, pp. 300-301) 
also acknowledges: ‟entrepreneurial leaders often become consumers of ideas 
generated by intellectual leaders”. However, Juncker, as the first President 
elected through the Spitzenkandidaten process, comes with a new vision of the 
European Commission, namely a political commission. This is visible in the 
following paragraph: The Commission is political. And I want it to be more 
political. Indeed, it will be highly political. Its make-up must reflect the 
plurality of the majority of ideas which take shape, but also in operationalizing 
the structure of the Commission, as will be seen later in the article (Juncker, 
2014b, p. 1). 
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In Juncker’s case, the analysis takes into consideration a possible 
structural leadership, because at one point in his speech he puts on his agenda 
the need to reform the Troika, noting that the European Parliament was the 
one who drew attention to the lack of its democratic character. Given these, 
the following fragment could be considered as a possible element of structural 
leadership: I would like us to reconsider the instrument of the Troika. The 
European Parliament has stated in reports on the subject that the Troika as it 
works at present lacks democratic substance. It does lack democratic 
substance; it lacks a parliamentary dimension. We must review the Troika and 
make it more democratic, more parliamentary and more political. We will do 
this (Juncker, 2014b, pp. 4-5). One possible reasoning is that Juncker, on the 
model of the bargaining leverage, has tried to attract even more support from 
Parliament by popularizing the Troika problem. Moreover, Juncker dedicated 
the entire beginning of his political guidelines to praise the Parliament for the 
Spitzenkandidaten system.  
Therefore, Juncker's leadership is entrepreneurial and structural, 
because, it has shaped the agenda for the European Union to act big on big and 
small on small. Juncker also acted as a broker, making deals for the main 
issues at stake, such as the refugee crisis, renewable energy, unemployment, 
the single digital market and the social-economic market. Moreover, Juncker 
set the agenda by setting an ambitious target such as Europe being the first in 
renewable energy. On the other hand, Juncker is an inventor in that he 
introduces a new vision of the European Commission, namely a political 
commission, not a technocratic one. Furthermore, elements of structural 
leadership can be identified in Juncker's leadership, as they act as bargaining 
leverage to try to attract support from Parliament, as it refers to the need to 
reform the Troika and to the fact that it is the first Parliament that truly elected, 
given the Spitzenkandidaten procedure, which further strengthened the 
Commission's relationship with Parliament. 
 
Ursula von der Leyen 
Ursula von der Leyen adopted an entrepreneurial and intellectual 
leadership style when setting the agenda. In this regard, von der Leyen acted 
as an agenda-setter and broker by introducing environmental issues on the 
European agenda on the one hand and shaped the thinking by introducing a 
new vision, Green Deal, on the other. Therefore, in order to identify the 
leadership style approached by Ursula von der Leyen at the time of setting the 
agenda, the article will analyze her speeches from July 16 and November 27, 
2019.  
To begin with, the ambitious character of the program proposed by von 
der Leyen can be seen from the title: A Union that strives for more. In terms 
of entrepreneurial leadership, von der Leyen (2019b, p. 2) assumes the role of 
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agenda-setter, by setting the following goals on climate issues: I want Europe 
to become the first climate-neutral continent in the world by 2050. […] Our 
current goal of reducing our emissions by 40% by 2030 is not enough. We 
must go further. We must strive for more. […] I will put forward a Green Deal 
for Europe in my first 100 days in office. I will put forward the first ever 
European Climate Law which will set the 2050 target into law and the role of 
populariser (Von der Leyen, 2019c, p. 7) in order to draw attention to 
environmental issues that require urgent leadership and action.  
Given the context of the international crises, with the taking over of 
the President's mandate, Ursula von der Leyen inherited a number of problems 
from the former Commission, for which she proposed a series of solution 
options, thus assuming the role of a broker. In other words, von der Leyen 
(2019b, p. 4) addressed issues that were not resolved by the Juncker 
Commission, such as: the refugee crisis, here emphasizing on unitary action 
and cooperation through the reformation of the Dublin regulations and a New 
Pact on Migration and Asylum (We must reduce irregular migration, we must 
fight smugglers and traffickers – it is organised crime –, we must preserve the 
right to asylum and improve the situation of refugees […] A Common 
European Asylum System must be exactly that – common), United Kingdom 
withdrawal, which von der Leyen states that will remain an ally, 
unemployment, for which Ursula von der Leyen provided A European 
Unemployment Benefit Reinsurance Scheme, the completion of Capital 
Markets Union, through medium-sized enterprises ([…] the small and 
medium-sized enterprises. They are innovative, they are entrepreneurial, they 
are flexible and agile, they create jobs, they provide vocational training to our 
youth. But they can only do all this if they have access to capital everywhere 
in this huge Single market. Let's get rid of all the barriers. Let's open the door. 
Let's finally complete the Capital Markets Union) and a more united Europe 
([…] we must have the courage to take foreign policy decisions by qualified 
majority). Moreover, von der Leyen (2019c, p. 13) shapes the agenda in such 
a way as to bring to the fore the two main objectives, which could underlie the 
change and which she names ‟the twin transition”, as observed in her speech: 
The twin transition – climate and digitalisation – will bring changes for all 
[…]We should harness this transformative power of the twin climate and 
digital transition to strengthen our own industrial base and innovation 
potential. Further, von der Leyen (2019b, p. 7) demonstrates through her 
speech that she has approached an entrepreneurial leadership style, which is 
most visible when she recognizes that she is assuming a mediator or broker 
role, because she has listened to the problems and has established the 
directions that can bring joint gains for both the Commission and the European 
Parliament as follows: […] I want us to work together to improve the 
Spitzenkandidaten system. We need to make it more visible to the wider 
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electorate and we need to address the issue of transnational lists at the 
European elections as a complementary tool of European democracy. […] I 
support a right of initiative for the European Parliament. When this House, 
acting by majority of its Members, adopts Resolutions requesting the 
Commission to submit legislative proposals, I commit to responding with a 
legislative act in full respect of the proportionality, subsidiarity, and better 
law-making principles. It is possible that she acted in the same way Juncker 
did, by trying to attract more support from the Parliament, by using the 
negotiation leverage strategy and thus being a structural leader.  
In terms of intellectual leadership, as in Delors' case, Leyen set the 
agenda from ground zero, proposing a new approach to existing issues, a 
system of ideas that would shape thinking. In other words, if in Delors’ case 
there is the Single European Market and the European Union, in the case of 
Leyen there is Green Deal. On the other hand, if Juncker created a political 
Commission, as the first President elected through Spitzenkandidaten, von der 
Leyen (2019b, p. 6) created a Commission based on gender equality, as the 
first female president. These actions can be considered as elements of an 
innovative, modernization and reform vision (As the first woman to be 
president of the Commission, every Member of my College will have a gender-
balanced Cabinet – for the very first time. And by the end of our mandate, we 
will have gender equality at all levels of management – for the very first time). 
To sum up, Ursula von der Leyen is a practitioner of entrepreneurial 
leadership because she has shaped and set the agenda for climate issues, acting 
as a populariser for the urgent need to make Europe the first climate-neutral 
continent. Also, given the fact that she inherited several unsolved issues from 
the Juncker Commission, von der Leyen acted as a broker, providing solutions 
and presenting the options available for these issues (migration, Brexit, 
unemployment). Moreover, she acted as an inventor, proposing a new problem 
management strategy, namely through twin transitionclimate and 
digitalization. Finally, von der Leyen is also an intellectual leader, as she 
shaped the thinking by introducing a new approach to the issues at hand, 
namely the Green Deal. 
 
The political leadership of the European Commission 
Having an image of their leadership styles, this chapter will focus on 
how the three Commission presidents have exercised their political leadership 
by influencing and shaping the decision-making process. In this respect, the 
following variables will be considered: first, what is the proposed Commission 
design (the College of Commissioners' organizational chart); secondly, the 
way they mobilized resources from the main European institutions; third, how 
they formed networks and coalitions, both intra-institutionally and inter-
institutionally. 
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Jacques Delors 
Delors has exercised his political leadership mainly through the 
relations with the Franco-German tandem and the ad hoc networks formed at 
the level of the European Commission, these being his most important 
resources. However, to demonstrate this, the three variables mentioned above 
will be considered.  
First, regarding the political design of Delors's team, it consists of: 2 
former Deputy Prime Ministers, 9 former Ministers, 4 returning 
Commissioners and 3 former Members of the European Parliament, of which 
6 Vice Presidents. Given the fact that prior to the Maastricht Treaty (1993), 
the President of the Commission had no involvement in appointing the 
Commissioners, it can be argued that Delors did not build his Commission for 
the purpose of being political, as can be seen from the team's design from 
above. In the case of Delors, it is important to mention the reform of the 
Spokesman Service, by establishing a single chief spokesperson (Hugo 
Paemen) under his direct supervision, to strengthen his control over public 
relations. In this regard, Delors urged his new team not to assign the posit ion 
of spokesman to any member of their offices, having control over public 
relations and being able to speak on behalf of the entire Commission (Endo, 
1999, p. 49). 
Secondly, Delors mobilized its resources from double membership in 
the European Council, recognizing that the full participation in the European 
Council gives him authority over its colleagues, being more than primus inter 
pares and thus his policies are difficult to challenge by the other 
Commissioners. Moreover, since 1985, Delors has become the one presenting 
important issues of the European Community within the European Council, 
and as a result, the position of President of the Commission has been raised 
close to the level of a government leader (Endo, 1999, p. 58). 
Thirdly, Delors has created coalitions and networks at the organization 
level, among the most important being the alliance with the Paris-Bonn Axis 
and the networks developed by his chief of staff, Pascal Lamy and by the 
Secretary General, Emile Noël. As for the relationship with Francois 
Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, this proved to be advantageous because Delors 
had their support at the time of taking over as President. This was due in large 
part to the fact that both the French President and the German Chancellor 
shared Delors' vision of the single market and the monetary union (Kassim 
et.al., 2019a, p. 8). Moreover, policies such as the Social Charter or the Media 
program would not have been possible if Delors had not acted in the sense of 
influencing Mitterrand for support. In addition, Helmut Kohl proposed Delors 
as President of the Commission, and their relationship was strengthened the 
most when Delors supported the unification of Germany, being the first 
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European leader to act in this manner (Endo 1999, p. 63). On the other hand, 
regarding Delors' networks, they play an important role in facilitating the 
realization of policies, political objectives and in influencing the agenda, being 
formed on the basis of personal relationships or political ideologies. In this 
regard, it is worth mentioning the ad hoc networks created in 1984, within the 
'Institutional Group', having as main members Noël, Ehlermann, Perissich and 
Lamoureux, was an important factor in the process of drafting the Single 
European Act (Endo, 1999, p. 54). In the same vein, the network led by Lamy 
transformed Delors' presidential cabinet into "the executor of presidential will 
inside the Commission", thereby monopolizing access to the President. In this 
regard, Lamy made sure that the proposals of the other commissioners, who 
did not follow the same direction with Delors, were rejected from the agenda 
(under the pretext that the agenda is pre-loaded), Lamy making use of Article 
4 of the Rules of Procedure, which specifies that the new topics must be 
notified 10 days before being introduced on the agenda. Also, the most 
important members of Lamy's network in France were the French Minister of 
Finance and the École Nationale d'Administration graduates, and in Germany, 
Joachim Bitterlich (Kohl's adviser on foreign affairs), who represented a 
strong link between Delors and Kohl (Endo, 1999, pp. 47-48). 
Therefore, Delors exercised his political leadership through ad hoc 
networks, Franco-German tandem relations and by exploiting the resources 
from double membership in the European Council, factors that allowed him to 
influence and shape the agenda and attract supporters to follow his desired 
direction towards the Single European Market and later the European Union. 
 
Jean Claude Juncker 
Juncker has exercised his political leadership by building a political 
Commission, by reforming the Commission to centralize the power and 
strengthen the office of the President, but also by consolidating the 
relationship with the European Parliament. 
Regarding the political design of the Juncker Commission, the 
distribution of resources underwent a series of changes and transformations. 
These transformations, as were mentioned at the beginning, originate in the 
Spitzenkandidaten procedure, whereby Juncker states that the European 
Parliament chose, in the true sense of the word, for the first time: You are the 
first Parliament to truly elect, in all senses of the word, the President of the 
Commission. You will elect him in a new spirit. In the aftermath of the 
elections, you insisted that the results, produced by universal suffrage, had to 
be taken into account.  (Juncker, 2014b, p. 1). In other words, this new 
interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty gave Juncker the authority and legitimacy 
that underpinned its reforms on the organization of the Commission.  
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First of all, even though the procedure does not allow for the President 
to choose his team of Commissioners, Juncker went against the procedure to 
influence the granting of specific portfolios to certain Commissioners, making 
use of his authority, electoral mandate and prestige to select his team (Kassim 
& Laffan, 2019b, p. 52). Thus Juncker’s political Commission needed a 
majority of members to have a political background because a political 
commission has to be created of experienced politicians, the Commission 
being political, not technocratic, as he argued in his September 10 speech: We 
will be political, and not technocratic (Juncker, 2014d, p. 3) and July 15th: 
The Commission is not a technical committee made up of civil servants who 
implement the instructions of another institution. The Commission is political 
(Juncker, 2014b, p. 1). Otherwise speaking, the new Commission structure 
includes: 9 former Prime Ministers or Deputy Prime Ministers, 19 former 
Ministers, 7 returning Commissioners and 8 former Members of the European 
Parliament; 11 of these have a very solid economic and finance background, 
whilst 8 have extensive foreign relations experience (Juncker, 2014d, p. 1). 
Secondly, Juncker (2014a, p. 30) changed the way the Commissioners were 
operating, focusing on cooperation, collaboration and teamwork, forming 7 
teams, led by the 7 Vice Presidents, arguing his choice by saying that: you can 
either have 28 Commissioners, each working in their own little corner, 
ensconced in splendid isolation, each looking after their own little fief, which 
is what would happen once the Commission’s tasks had been sliced and diced; 
or you can have Commissioners spreading their wings under the friendly aegis 
of Vice-Presidents who will coordinate their work. In this regard, Juncker 
(2014a, p. 29) named the former prime ministers as Vice Presidents, because 
he considers that they acted as coordinators in their former political careers. 
Juncker introduced a system of Vice-Presidents, to strengthen coordination 
between commissioners, to centralize decision-making in the Commission and 
to make explicit political decisions (Tömmel, 2018, p. 10). Additionally, his 
Commission is the first one created on two levels, namely the first level of 
seniors (Vice-Presidents), who supervise the other Commissioners’ work. 
Thus, the Vice-Presidents play the role of: […] planners, coordinators, 
drivers, mobilisers, organisers of ideas and initiatives (Juncker, 2014a, p. 30). 
Furthermore, Juncker has appointed Frans Timmermans as the First Vice 
President, who becomes his main source of help and has the power to decide 
whether the initiatives will be discussed by the College and added to the 
agenda: Another important novelty is the creation of a First Vice-President. 
Frans Timmermans will be my right-hand (Juncker, 2014d, p. 3). Third, 
Juncker added new ways of collaborative working for the Commission, 
highlighting the role and responsibilities of the First Vice President, as well as 
the Vice Presidents and working teams, the General Secretariat and the 
Presidential Cabinet in support of the former (European Commission, 2014). 
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In this regard, Juncker extended the powers of the First Vice President so that 
he could remove proposals that did not fit his priorities and consequently 80 
out of 450 proposals were removed. Moreover, the spokesmen of the 
individual commissioners were eliminated to avoid repeating the situation 
during the Barroso Commission, when they represented the interests of the 
commissioners more than those of the European Commission (Bürgin, 2017, 
p. 7). 
As for the inter-institutional relations, the most relevant ones are those 
with the European Parliament, as the Juncker Commission has strengthened 
and extended these relations. Some of the factors that underpinned the 
relationship between the Commission and Parliament are: the European 
Parliament was the main promoter of the Spitzenkandidaten procedure, and 
the EPP, S&D and ALDE leaders promised to support Juncker; Martin Schulz 
(S&D candidate and Juncker's friend) became President of the European 
Parliament; EPP and S&D concluded a power shifting agreement and formed 
a coalition, which supported Juncker and his program, by imposing a majority 
of work on Members of the European Parliament; relations were strengthened 
by the meetings between Juncker, Timmermans, Schulz, Manfred Weber (EPP 
leader) and Gianni Pitella (S&D manager); in Parliament and in trialogues, the 
Commission was more represented by Commissioners, not officials (Kassim 
& Laffan, 2019b, p. 54-55). On the other hand, relations with the European 
Council were not as cordial as some of the government leaders were skeptical 
of the Spitzenkandidaten process (they believed that the parliamentary 
Commission would undermine the authority, legitimacy and status of the 
supreme institution of the European Council), and in this context, the 
European Council adopted the Strategic Agenda (June 2014), prior to the 
appointment of Juncker Commission. However, Juncker and Tusk cooperated 
in several aspects concerning the European Union, such as: negotiations with 
Turkey over the refugee crisis, the Ukraine and Greek crisis, Brexit, but the 
relationship became tense with the management of the refugee crisis. Here, 
Juncker failed to convince Tusk on the importance and necessity of a quota 
system for taking over refugees, applied by each Member State (Kassim & 
Laffan, 2019b, p. 54). 
All these changes in the structure of the Commission and the strong 
link with the European Parliament represented the basis for the creation of a 
political Commission and the strengthening of the political leadership of the 
President of the Commission. However, Juncker failed to fully mobilize 
resources from the European Council, as relations were visibly strained when 
involved in the refugee crisis. 
 
 
 
European Scientific Journal July 2020 edition Vol.16, No.20 ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
21 
Ursula von der Leyen 
Following, it is important to consider the extent to which Ursula von 
der Leyen moved closer to Delors or Juncker's leadership model. However, it 
is worth mentioning that Ursula von der Leyen is still in the first year of her 
term as President of the Commission, which is why the analysis of her 
leadership could not be accurate. Therefore, the article will analyze the 
leadership she proposed in the first months of her term and look at the extent 
to which she exercised political leadership in the manner in which Juncker did 
or supranational leadership, based on networks and coalitions as Delors did. 
First of all, regarding the political design of Ursula von der Leyen's 
team, it is important to note that she did not have as much influence as Juncker 
in the formation of the College of Commissioners. However, the new team has 
a solid political background, even if it does not rise to the level of Juncker's 
team, comprising: 2 former Prime Ministers and 1 former Deputy Prime 
Ministers, 17 former Ministers, 8 returning Commissioners and 9 former 
Members of the European Parliament, and for the first time since 1995 the 
European Commission is not chaired by a former head of government. 
Moreover, Timmermans remained in the position of First Vice-President. Von 
der Leyen reformed de structure of the Commission as can be seen in the 
following: firstly, the number of Vice-Presidents was extended to eight; 
secondly, the eight Vice-Presidents are divided into 3 Executive Vice-
Presidents and 5 Vice-Presidents; thirdly, the three executive vice presidents 
have a dual role, dealing with a specific portfolio and being responsible for 
one of the core topics of the political agenda; von der Leyen introduced a new 
working method namely the Commissioners’ Groups, headed by an executive 
vice-president or vice-president, responsible for delivering coherent policies 
for the six priorities of the President (European Commission, 2019, pp. 7-8), 
although these groups are very similar to the cluster structure introduced by 
Juncker. Another novelty of von der Leyen’s (2019c, p. 7) Commission is the 
creation of a 'geopolitical Commission', as opposed to Juncker's 'political 
Commission'. Thus, the Commission agenda will be to reinforce the European 
Union's role in shaping the global order. 
Secondly, with regard to the mobilization of resources from the other 
institutions, von der Leyen's initiative to improve relations with the European 
Parliament is relevant. In this regard, von der Leyen proposed a series of 
actions to strengthen the European Parliament's partnership, as follows: 
support for a right of initiative of the European Parliament (this pledge goes 
beyond the treaty, in which the Commission has the exclusive right of 
initiative); the Commissioners will work with the European Parliament and 
inform it at all stages of legislative design and negotiations; the presence of 
Commissioners in trialogues discussions between Parliament and the Council; 
prioritizing a permanent dialogue between the Commission and Parliament; 
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full co-decision for the European Parliament; the Commission will broker the 
discussions between the Parliament and the European Council; improvement 
of the lead candidate system, specifically of the Spitzenkandidaten process, by 
making it more visible through addressing the issue of transnational lists 
which the Parliament rejected in 2018 (Von der Leyen, 2019a, p. 20; 
Euronews, 2018). However, the process of electing the President of the 
Commission demonstrated that von der Leyen would not have the same 
relationship with the Parliament that Juncker had, who contributed to the 
parliamentary process and was an important ally of the Parliament. Thus, 
given that she is not a Spitzenkandidat, her appointment encounters several 
opponents, including from the EPP, who considered this choice to be 
illegitimate, even if none of the lead candidates (Spitzenkandidaten: Manfred 
Weber-EPP, Frans Timmermans-PES, Margrethe Vestager-ALDE) would 
have obtained a majority in the European Parliament. That being said, von der 
Leyen will face several difficulties in trying to improve relations with a 
fragmented Parliament, which, although it does not have a stable majority, 
wants to have a role in the legislative initiative, an important fact that she 
pledged to do. 
Thirdly, it is worth mentioning that von der Leyen was supported by 
the Franco-German tandem in the appointment process as President of the 
Commission, with Macron nominating her for this position and thus, ending 
the institutional deadlock. Von der Leyen also strengthened the alliance with 
the French President by supporting some of Macron's favourite ideas, such as: 
negotiations for a minimum wage across states in the EU; support for a tax on 
revenues generated by digital companies; support for a carbon border tariff; 
support for the current tax on trade; the creation of a European investment 
bank dedicated to combating climate change; support for a transnational list 
for future European elections. However, there were a number of tensions 
between the two over von der Leyen's declaration of enlarging the European 
Union in the Western Balkans, which Macron vehemently opposed, and due 
to support for NATO, an organization criticized by Macron in 2019. On the 
other hand, the alliance with Germany is found primarily on account that 
Ursula von der Leyen worked as Minister of Defence in Germany, being the 
longest-serving member of Merkel's Cabinets. In other words, this Franco-
German tandem coalition is an important resource for Ursula von der Leyen's 
success in shaping and influencing the European agenda, especially because 
in 2020 and 2022 she will be able to mobilize Council resources due to the 
Germany and France chairing.  
Therefore, following the approach taken to identify the leadership 
model proposed by Ursula von der Leyen, the article argues that her leadership 
is closest to the leadership proposed by Delors for the following reasons: first, 
they both set the European agenda from zero-ground, introducing a new 
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vision, acting as inventors and shaping thinking; second, they have both 
strengthened their alliance with the Franco-German tandem, which is von der 
Leyen's most important external resource for influencing the agenda; thirdly, 
their appointment was made by the European Council, not by Parliament 
through Spitzenkandidaten. However, the similarities between Ursula von der 
Leyen's leadership and Juncker's leadership cannot be ignored. In that regard, 
it is worth mentioning that Leyen took over from Juncker the way in which 
the Commission was organized by teams or groups of Commissioners. 
Moreover, both von der Leyen and Juncker sought to attract the support of the 
European Parliament, Juncker succeeding in this through the 
Spitzenkandidaten, and von der Leyen in promising legislative initiative for 
Parliament. Also, regarding the political nature of the Commissioners, the 
article argues that Leyen's team is closer to Juncker's than Delors', although its 
power to influence the appointment of the College was limited, not as in the 
case of Juncker, who greatly influenced the formation of his team. For that 
reason, so far, von der Leyen's leadership is closer to a style of supranational 
political leadership than to that proposed by Juncker, which has somewhat 
changed the balance of power in the European Union in favour of Parliament. 
In support of this statement is the following passage from Ursula von der 
Leyen's (2019c, p. 7) speech: My Commission will not be afraid to speak the 
language of confidence and assertiveness. But we will do it our way, the 
European way, where it can be seen clearly that the relationship with the 
European Parliament will not be the same as it was for Juncker’s  Commission 
when he stated that: We, Parliament and Commission, will act in the general 
interest, and I want us to do it together (Juncker, 2014b, p. 1).  
Table 2. The political leadership of the European Commission according to the three variables 
 Political design of the 
Commission 
Mobilization of 
resources from 
other European 
institutions 
Coalitions and ad 
hoc networks 
Delors -2 former Deputy Prime 
Ministers, 9 former Ministers, 
4 returning Commissioners 
and 3 former Members of the 
European Parliament, of 
which 6 Vice Presidents 
-reform of the Spokesperson 
Service 
-European Council - the alliance with 
the Paris-Bonn Axis 
-the networks 
developed by the 
head of his cabinet, 
Pascal Lamy and by 
the general secretary, 
Emile Noël. 
Juncker -9 former Prime Ministers or 
Deputy Prime Ministers, 19 
former Ministers, 7 returning 
Commissioners and 8 former 
Members of the European 
Parliament;  
-European 
Parliament 
-the alliance created 
with S&D and 
ALDE 
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-7 teams, led by the 7 vice 
presidents 
- the spokespersons of the 
individual commissioners 
were eliminated 
Von der 
Leyen 
-2 former Prime Ministers and 
1 former Deputy Prime 
Ministers, 17 former 
Ministers, 8 returning 
Commissioners and 9 former 
Members of the European 
Parliament 
-the number of vice-presidents 
has been extended to eight (3 
executive vice-presidents and 
5 vice-presidents) 
-Groups of Commissioners, 
headed by an Executive Vice 
President or Vice President 
(similar to Juncker's model) 
-European 
Parliament 
 
-the relationship with 
the Franco-German 
tandem. 
 
Conclusion 
Given the fact that no actor at the European Union level has exclusive 
leadership and that the President of the Commission has limited 
decision-making powers, the most relevant political leadership role of the 
Commission is through the agenda-setting and through shaping and 
influencing the decision-making process, in order to advance in the desired 
direction. The agenda-setting is relevant in the current context, along with the 
new President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, who has outlined the 
agenda to solve unresolved or partially solved problems by the previous 
Commission and introduced a novelty on the European agenda through the 
Green Deal, and thus bringing a new issue on the European agenda, as in the 
case of Delors, who stood out for one of the most important moments in setting 
the agenda, namely Single European Market (1985). Regarding the Juncker 
Commission, on the other hand, it is difficult to identify agenda-setting from 
zero-ground, rather a continuation of Barroso's agenda, but the novelty 
consists in the approach to the Commission, as a political one, not a 
technocratic one. For this reason, this research has compared three 
Commission Chairs, namely Jacques Delors, Jean-Claude Juncker and Ursula 
von der Leyen, to identify the leadership model adopted when setting the 
agenda and how they have exercised political leadership in order to influence 
the decision-making process and to shape the agenda. 
Thus, regarding the agenda-setting leadership, applying the theoretical 
framework identified by Oran Young (structural, entrepreneurial and 
intellectual leadership) on the President’s speeches (candidacy and inaugural), 
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a series of conclusions were reached. First of all, Delors is an entrepreneurial 
and intellectual leader, largely for his efforts in shaping the European agenda 
to overcome impediments and achieve joint gains, but most importantly for 
introducing the idea of the European Single Market and the European Union 
on the agenda. Secondly, Juncker is an entrepreneurial and structural leader, 
owing to the brokerage actions regarding the refugee crisis, renewable energy, 
unemployment, the single digital market and the social-economic market, due 
to his new vision on a political Commission and his efforts to attract the 
support of the European Parliament as a result of the Spitzenkandidaten 
process. Third, Ursula von der Leyen is an entrepreneurial and intellectual 
leader, in view of the fact that she has shaped and set the agenda for climate 
issues, stressing the importance of Europe becoming the first climate-neutral 
continent because she has provided solutions to the inherited issues from the 
Juncker Commission (migration, Brexit, unemployment), but also for the way 
she shaped thinking by introducing a new vision, the Green Deal. Thus, the 
article concludes that one of the most important roles of the President of the 
Commission can be seen in setting the European agenda, which depends 
largely on the level of ambition and mobilization of resources, and in this 
regard, the article emphasizes on the importance of the three leadership styles 
and the need of the existence of more than one. In other words, the three 
Commission Presidents largely addressed an entrepreneurial leadership style, 
which is essential in inter-institutional negotiations, intellectual by introducing 
innovative visions and structurally by attracting institutions to support their 
position. 
On the other hand, regarding the political leadership, the three 
variables, namely the political nature of the members of the Commission, the 
mobilization of resources from the other European institutions and the creation 
of networks or coalitions were taken into account. First of all, Delors exercised 
his political leadership the most through ad hoc networks and the relationship 
with the Franco-German tandem. Secondly, Juncker, as a more special case 
due to his appointment by the Parliament not by the European Council, 
exercised his most visible political leadership by influencing the political 
composition of the Commission, mobilizing resources from the European 
Parliament and building a coalition with EPP, S&D and ALDE leaders. Lastly, 
Ursula von der Leyen acted politically through her relationship with the 
Franco-German tandem as Delors and by trying to gain the support of the 
European Parliament as Juncker did, but as in the case of Delors, it had no 
influence in the formation of a political Commission team.  
Therefore, the research has concluded that von der Leyen’s leadership 
model is more closely to Delors’s model, although a few similarities can be 
seen with Juncker’s leadership, with the intention to strengthen the 
relationship with the European Parliament and in the way the Commission was 
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organized in several clusters. Even though, given that von der Leyen is only 
in the first year in office, these results may change in the coming years. 
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